Is Democracy with Hierarchic, Familial Society a Real Democracy?

In the little town of Lucena two hours bus-ride south of Manila, there is a little park right on the main north-south boulevard running the length of the town.  Despite being just south of the commercial markets and malls, the park has a constantly solemn air, maintained by uniformed guards lazily watching the passers-by from their wooden rocking chairs under the big trees.  In the middle of the park is an imposing statue of Manuel L. Quezon, the first president of the Second Philippine Republic, after whom Quezon Province (for which Lucena is the capital) is named.

Behind the imposing statue is a rock wall, on which a concise excerpt of a speech by Quezon is displayed.  Necessarily patriotic, the words are enthusiastically infused with the bright future Quezon imagined for the young republic coming out of American and Japanese occupations at the end of the 1940s.  He spoke of Philippines as a beacon of bright light for freedom and democracy in an Asian continent still torn by legacies of Western colonialism, and the leading role the country will play on this side of the Pacific as the sole inheritor of Christian values in the Orient.

Quezon clearly saw Philippines as the conduit by which liberal democracy shall blossom in Asia, a teacher for all nations to its immediate west still mired in their authoritarian ways.  She, to Quezon, clearly stood on moral high ground as perhaps the most "politically enlightened" country in the region.  In many ways, Quezon was right: the first post-WWII democracies, e.g. Japan, India, and Malaysia, remained in state of one-party domination well after establishing post-WWII democracies, while the second wave of democracy (Taiwan, South Korea, etc) did not occur until decades later in the 1980s.

And only years after Quezon made his iconic statements engraved on the stone wall, Filipino democracy, the beacon of Asia, was also brought down, along with several others in the region (Indonesia, Myanmar, and to a certain degree, Thailand) by military intervention fueled by popular discontent with under-performing democratic governments.  It is especially interesting to revisit Quezon's word and the ups-and-downs of democracy in Asia now, with major national elections looming in both Philippines and Malaysia.

Yet, the fundamental problem of the Asian democracy, ironically, can easily be found, just a short distance from where the Quezon statue stands.  With one week left until the polls, all candidates are blasting their messages with billboards, posters, and recorded voices from mobile speakers installed on campaign trucks and jeepneys.  Interestingly, one sees relatives and families under the same party-list ("wait, why does the mayor and vice mayor candidates have the same last name?") and candidates speaking of their families' "historical contributions" to the city and Philippines.

Some candidates have qualms about making remarks on "when my grandpa was the mayor..." or "when my dad was a senator...", straightforwardly using family political legacies to bestow perceptions of political capabilities or more simply, legitimacy for even running for the position.  The audience seems to lap it all up.  They nod in agreement to the arguments that "father good, soon good" logic, fondly remembering the projects their Sanchez Sr completed last decade.  Sanchez Jr does not need to clarify his policies.  His constituency expect him to continue his father's deeds, and he says he will.

The insular familial politics is not unique in the Philippines.  Whether it be India, Singapore, Indonesia, and Thailand, in both democracies and non-democracies, big families dominate politics generation after generation and run the country as a family business.  It is only funny to see that these big families do not fall when mistakes are made.  Later generations seem to discount and forget their ancestors' grave mistakes and unpopular moves of the past, and the voters do not seem to remind the big families of past scandals and wrongdoings.  Family dominance become solidified and families' powers unchecked.

The familial nature of politics here may largely be blamed on a sense of non-pluralism in civic society.  People do not hear voices of opposition, which generally have few venues to be channeled and disseminated, even with supposedly free press in action.  And as South Korea's most recent election results have shown, good reminiscence of the past tend to linger more than the bad, and the hierarchic influence of older generations' voting tendencies on the younger ones cannot be under-estimated.  People do not, or are simply scared of becoming community or family outcasts, vote independently.

Oh yeah, and do not forget, voting is good money.  The rumors on the streets are this election's vote will be bid up to 500-1000 pesos each.  Big families, of course, are rich families.  And what is more "freedom" than being able to buy what you want, what is more "democratic" than sharing of wealth?  One has to be sympathetic to Quezon, to Gandhi, to Sukarno, to Aung San...family politics and vote buying has destroyed their respective young democracies.  Some are replaced outright by military rule, while others remained nominally democratic.  But even then, when a few families led, is it democratic?

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